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PLATO, HERACLITUS AND DANTE ON AMBIGUITY  
Some notes to Prof. Smith's paper 
Filippo Forcignanò  
 
 
Professor Smith's paper takes the sixth book of Aeneid as manifesto of the ability 
of the poetry to represent the ambiguity. This is a very interesting choice. If I 
have correctly understood the purpose of Smith's paper, the case of Virgil al-
lows us to bring to light the difficulties of philosophy when it tries to talk 
about the ambiguity of the reality. Virgil is instead able to represent a very con-
tradictory and ambiguous otherworldly dimension, in which the human and the 
non-human are mixed together. Not only the great Latin poet is not afraid to 
speak of ambiguity, but his poetry has a linguistic baggage and very refined ex-
pressive tools to do it. Virgil does not think we should dissolve the ambiguity 
with the power of the logos. This attitude is not shared by many ancient (and 
not only ancient) philosophers: certainly not by Plato.  
Smith's paper starts with a quote from a famous passage in Plato's Re-
public about the ontological status of the empirical things. In this note I intend 
to discuss this passage in order to show that Plato conceives philosophy as the 
overcoming of the ambiguity of reality by the power of logos. Furthermore I 
mean to present very briefly (and incompletely) a sketch about the difference 
between Virgil's Polydorus and Dante's Pier Delle Vigne, in order to show that 
Pier is more ambiguous and more uncanny than Polydorus.  
In the fifth book of the Republic Plato is committed to show that there 
is a not remediable difference between the philosopher and the philodoxer. 
Who is the philodoxer? Surely, as the word suggests, he is a δόξα (opinion) 
lover. But this specification is tautological. So, who loves the δόξα? Plato's an-
swer (475d) is that the philodoxers are φιλοθεάμονες and φιλήκοοι. These two 
terms are likely to be neologisms, as the following φιλοτέχνους (476a). They 
are constructed in consonance with the term φιλόσοφος, but opposite to it. 
The φιλοθεάμονες are those who love the shows (i.e. the theater); the 
φιλήκοοι are those loving conversation, discourses, rhetorical and sophistical 
ostentation; finally, the φιλοτέχνους are those who very appreciate art in gen-
eral. In sum, the philodoxer is a canonical figure in the Athens of the Fifth 
Century b.C., a sort of intellectual strongly linked with the democratic culture 
of the polis. Plato identifies and taunts this kind of intellectual in Hippias, who 
is not able to think philosophically, as can be seen from the dialogues dedicat-
ed to him1. To our contemporary readers the contrast between the philosopher 
and the lover of the shows may appear bizarre. But the democratic Athens was 
a theatrocracy and the poets were intended as educators of the city. For my pur-
pose it is therefore interesting that in the locus indicated by Prof. Smith Plato 
contrasts the knowledge of the philosopher to that of poetry's lovers. Obvious-
ly, according to Plato they have not knowledge. But the philodoxer is sure to 
have it, so it is necessary to debate with him. He has not a gentle soul and does 
not accept the philosophical refutation, the elenchos. So it is impossible to dis-
cuss philosophically with him. Glaucon therefore wears the mask of the philo-
doxer and he discusses with Socrates about his (i.e. philodoxer's) alleged 
knowledge. The focus of the argument (476e4-477b11) is to disclose to the 
                                                             
1 Cfr. Platone, La Repubblica, a cura di M. Vegetti, BUR, Milano 2006, pp. 722-723, n. 71. 
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philodoxer that what he calls «knowledge» actually is «opinion», that it is not 
knowledge and that it cannot be knowledge. The argument runs as follows: 
 
1. who knows, knows something that is; 
2. what is not, can not be known; 
3. what completely is (παντελῶς ὄν), it is completely knowable (παντελῶς 
γνωστόν); what in no way is (μὴ ὄν μηδαμῇ), it's totally unknowable 
(πάντῃ ἄγνωστον); 
4. if something is and is not at the same time, it is intermediate between 
what purely is and what is not at all (μεταξὺ ἄν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς 
ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῇ ὄντος); 
5. knowledge refers to being, while ignorance to not being, for what is in-
termediate between being and not being there must be something that 
is intermediate between knowledge and ignorance (μεταξύ τι καὶ 
ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης); 
6. because opinion is something, and it is different from knowledge, its 
object will be different from that of knowledge and that of ignorance; 
7. if there is something intermediate between being and not being, i.e. be-
tween knowledge and ignorance, that is the object of the opinion. 
 
 
What is intermediate between being and not being? The sensible ob-
jects. The ontological status of the sensible objects is structurally ambiguous, 
according to Plato, and Prof. Smith is right to emphasize the expression τὸ 
ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι (478e1-2): «[sensible objects] 
partecipate both of being and not being». This is the key of the whole passage. 
Plato resorts to a very particular verb in Resp. 479b10, when he writes that the 
particulars seem to ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν. The verb ἐπαμφοτερίζω means «to be 
double» in the sense of «play a double game», «partake to both kinds», «be two-
faced». Thucydides, for example, uses it (VIII 85, 3) to speak about person 
who are two-faced, ambiguous in action and thinking. In Aristotle the verb ac-
quires a taxonomic meaning: «having characters of two different species» (like 
the seals). The focal meaning of these uses is the ambiguity of what «plays a 
double game».  
According to Plato the reality is self-contradictory. Probably Smith's 
suggestion that Heidegger might have translated τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον as glei-
chursprünglich is right, but in Plato the meaning is more likely to «be two-faced». 
Prof. Smith asks:  
 
and how can we find ways to interpret the equivocal, questionable, and 
self-contradictory “reality” – “It is, is it not?” – that we experience as 
we move down from sense perception through sleep and dreams to 
“touch upon” death? Might not this descent toward ultimate indeter-
minacy characterize most adequately an inescapable dimension of our 
factual human condition? If so, what is the kind of speech that would 
allow us to say what we encounter in this experience? 
 
Plato's position is peculiar, also in relation to Virgil. The ambiguity is 
not placed at a lower level than that perceivable, but in the tangible world. Our 
experience of the world is, according to Plato, irremediably ambiguous. Resp. 
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VII 534-cd - a passage that Smith quotes - is quite evidently a proof that in Pla-
to's philosophy the condition of those who live immersed in the sensory di-
mension corresponds to the half-sleep and even death. It indeed affirms that 
who is not able to delimit in the discourse the ideas (in the text: the Beautiful), 
beating the rebuttals with the unshakeable force of the logical discourse, lives 
all his life in a sleep, slowly dying. The difference between a life entirely dedi-
cated to perception and the death is simply temporal: in the Hades the sleep is 
perennial. 
Why perception is so strictly banned from philosophy? The answer is 
the intermediate status between being and not being of which it is said. The 
enigma of the eunuch quoted in 479c is the puerile but incisive depiction of the 
ambiguity of the empirical things: they are and they are not what they are. The 
same things appear to those who look sometimes in one way and sometimes in 
another, in a certain sense x and in another non-x. They share contradictory 
properties. The empirical world is, according to Plato, Heracliteian: a perennial 
flux without standstill, in which everything is and not is, or better is itself and 
also its contradiction. The very difference between Heraclitus and Plato is that 
the philosopher of Ephesus believes it is the assignment of the philosopher to 
assume the contradiction of the world, while Plato thinks that philosophy 
should dissolve it. The theory of Forms is Plato's challenge to ambiguity. 
 
*** 
 
Prof. Smith quotes Heraclitus fr. 26 as an opposite direction from Pla-
to's Republic. Once again, I believe that Prof. Smith is right to consider fr. 26 
closer to the spirit of Homer and Virgil - the sleep is death's twin - than that of 
Plato. Fr. 26 is of great importance in the hermeneutical interpretations of 
Heraclitus, curiously more than in the historical-philosophical. In the winter 
semester seminar of the Academic Year 1966/1967, Martin Heidegger and Eu-
gen Fink have long discussed how to interpret fr. 26. According to Fink's in-
terpretation, the fragment situates the man in an intermediate position between 
night and light. More generally, Fink - both in Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von 
Raum-Zeit-Bewegung (Den Haag 1957) and in Spiel als Weltsymbol (Stuttgart 1960) 
- interprets Heraclitus focusing on the concept of πῦρ (fire). It is interesting, I 
think, that the man of Heraclitus is, according to Fink, similar to the Centaur. 
The Centaur is an ambiguous creature, half man and half horse. Heidegger de-
clares the text of the fragment given by Clement of Alexandria incomprehensi-
ble, because he introduces the fragment speaking about τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῆς 
ψυχῆς, but there is nothing about it in the fragment. Both Fink and Heidegger 
consider essential to the understanding of the fragment the verb ἄπτεσθαι, that 
Prof. Smith emphasizes. Gadamer also considers it important. Unlike 
Heidegger, Gadamer thinks that Clement remark about τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῆς 
ψυχῆς is einen klaren Hinweis about the correspondence between sleep and 
death2. There are three oppositions in the fragment: light-darkness, wakeful-
ness-sleep, life-death. According to Gadamer, the pre-Socratic philosophy is to 
be read from that of Plato and Aristotle. All the interpretations that try to ig-
                                                             
2 Heraklit-Studien, in Gesammelte Werke, Mohr, Tübingen 1991, vol. VII: Griechische Philosophie III: 
Plato im Dialog, pp. 43-82. 
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nore this approach are mere historicism3. But Gadamer exaggerates to put in 
contact the polarity of Heraclitus' thinking and die platonische Frage nach dem 
Einen und Vielen4. About the fr. 26, Gadamer considers crucial the Heraclitean 
notion of psyche, comparing the self-ignition of the fire and the self-movement 
of the Platonic soul, on the basis of the Charmides (169a). My impression, how-
ever, is that this will lead to a weakening of the ambiguity unwelcome to Hera-
clitus. 
 
*** 
 
The most powerful and evocative depiction of the ambiguity in the 
sixth book of Aeneides is, according to me, the characterization of the golden 
bough. I want to emphasize in particular the following verses (145-148): 
 
ergo alte vestige oculis et rite repertum 
carpe manu; namque ipse volens facilisque sequetur, 
si te fata vocant; aliter non viribus ullis 
vincere nec duro poteris convellero ferro. 
 
The Cumaean Sybil is speaking about a bough. It is obviously strange 
that it is golden and it shines in the dark. But the most incredible linguistic 
twisting is the participle volens: the bough has a will, can decide whether or not 
to follow Aeneas' hand. The ambiguity of the enigma «a man… not a man…» 
is here manifest. We are in the sixth book, so these lines can not fail to remind 
to the reader what he has read in the third book about Polydorus. Son of Pri-
am and Hecuba, Polydorus is now transformed into a shrub, and Aeneas meets 
him in this disturbing appearance. I don't know another passage in Western lit-
erature in which the sense of alienation and ambiguity of a-man-not-a-man is 
stronger that in this Virgil's book. Except, as I will explain further, in Dante's 
Inferno. The golden bough appears invincible, while Polydorus is terribly vul-
nerable. The bough has a will, but does not suffer as a man, whom Aeneas 
tears three times the branches, weeps and bleeds. More than anything else, he 
cries and begs.  
Prof. Smith mentions Dante in a note, but if my reference to Polydorus 
as the highest manifestation of ambiguity in Virgil (and not only in Virgil) is 
correct, I think it is impossible not to recall here the thirteenth canto of Dan-
te's Inferno. Dante has in fact understood that the alienation that the reader feels 
in front of Polydorus is due to ambiguity of a-man-not-a-man. According to 
Freud, das Unheimliche (the uncanny) is that sort of frightening that goes back to 
what we have known for a long time, to what is familiar to us. Polydorus is 
surely uncanny in this sense. The sad eternal destiny of Pier Delle Vigne is un-
canny too. The wood in which Dante meets Pier is intermediate between the 
human life and the infernal life (4-9):  
 
Non fronda verde, ma di color fosco; 
non rami schietti, ma nodosi e 'nvolti; 
non pomi v'eran, ma stecchi con tosco. 
Non ha sì aspri sterpi né sì folti 
                                                             
3 See L'inizio della filosofia occidentale, Guerini, Milano 1993, p. 14. 
4 Heraklit-Studien, cit., p. 74. 
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quelle fiere selvagge che 'n odio hanno 
tra Cecina e Corneto i luoghi colti. 
 
Dante uses a well-known place in Maremma to provide a reference to 
the human dimension, but what he describes is not human. The first creatures 
that Dante and Virgil encounter are the Harpies. Dante hears «guai», but he 
can not see any human shadow. With an extraordinary poetic ability, Dante re-
ports this feeling to a daily life case (25-27): 
 
Cred' ïo ch'ei credette ch'io credesse 
che tante voci uscisser, tra quei bronchi, 
da gente che per noi si nascondesse. 
 
Virgil knows the reality and so asks Dante to uproot a twig. The log 
screams, and Dante, terrified, understands the truth. Pier reveals without pre-
tense his current dehumanized condition. But there is a crucial difference be-
tween Polydorus and Pier, really important for the purpose of this note. The 
bush has grown over Polydorus, while Pier is the shrub. Pier's soul is now a 
shrub, all the essence of Pier is now his prison. The great Italian critic Frances-
co De Sanctis described in a mighty way Pier's condition5: he is now a shrub, 
nothing in his physiognomy is human, but one profoundly human thing is pre-
served in him: the memory. De Sanctis writes: «essa è qualche cosa di vivente 
che non è lui, o che piuttosto è l'antico lui: egli è un tronco». With this amazing 
variation on Virgil's page, Dante reveals himself a poet of unparalleled power. 
If the condition of a-man-not-a-man is the manifesto of ambiguity, Dante's 
Pier Delle Vigne is even more ambiguous and uncanny than Virgil's Polydorus. 
                                                             
5 Saggi critici, a cura di L. Russo, Bari 1952, vol. I, pp. 116-119. 
